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The Declining World of T. E. Lawrence

New Republic

Trial by Television

The Long Ordeal of Secretary Stevens



EAST TENNESSEE
Johnson City, Tennessee
MAY 6 1954
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Washington Wire T. R. B.

Joseph N. Welch is an elderly pixie from Boston, with a huge nose, and we love him. He is the trial lawyer with the permanently surprised eyebrows whom the Army called in to handle its case with McCarthy. At first we mistook him and his balding head and big beak for a dull old codger; he seemed to be just another of Secretary Stevens' mistakes. But the quizzical lines round his long upper lip should have told us. He is a pixie. He can put a polished dart, poisoned with humor, into McCarthy's hide every time the latter rushes at him. He is a New England Puck looking at Caliban with suave interested contempt. He holds the taut audience in his hand and makes it shout with laughter; he waits, with parted lips and the innocence of a trusting child, for witness' answer and then makes the dry, lethal and hilarious comment. Here is a figure who is a match for McCarthy at last; who knows the use of ridicule and who bides his time to put McCarthy on the witness stand, under oath, and shorn of Congressional immunity. Will that happen? No; we can't believe it. Every instinct of the four GOP Senators on the Subcommittee, and of the Administration whose appeasement policy is really the culprit in the dock, is to call the fratricidal Republican battle off. McCarthy plans to keep Stevens on the witness stand indefinitely until his terms are met.

Fascinated disgust draws us to the hearings where the McCarthy staff strikes us as being as repellent a crew as you could find. We have watched them for years, and it is a comfort to know the nation is seeing them now, too. We don't hope for a direct or definitive verdict from the Mundt Committee in this nightmare show, but at least the public can now see for itself what things are like around here.

We don't believe Stevens can stay on as Army Secretary. Of course our sympathy is all with him against McCarthy. But to placate McCarthy, Stevens countermanded General Ryan's order (at Fort Dix, N. J.) against giving Private Schine a week-end pass; to appease McCarthy he sounded him out about firing General Lawton, commander at Fort Monmouth; McCarthy objected and Lawton stayed.

Through all this Eisenhower appears in the background, a blurred figure, going or coming from golfing vacations, appealing to the Publishers' Association for newspapers to print more unifying news; bitter now against McCarthy but not actually breaking with him by name nor coming to the aid of his assistant Stevens, who carried out the President's own appeasement policies.

The news is grim, too, from Geneva. Democrats hold their big Jefferson-Jackson Day conference here this week, and we have some advice for them. Do not say anything partisan about Geneva or the huge diplomatic defeat America is apparently about to suffer there. The fact is this is getting to be too grim for politics. (We confess, candidly, to being a bit scared by it.) What are we to think—or believe—now that the slogans of "massive retaliation" and the "new look" appear meaningless, now that the Army budget has been slashed, now that India appears to be more and more alienated, now that each week or so brings a new semi-official version of what is happening in Indo-China and how we propose to deal with it, now that it appears the Administration breathed first hot and then cold for armed intervention? Gracious knows, we lack exact information to judge the affair: whether we are wise to avoid a show-down or have simply passed the trouble on to our children. Will an Administration that appeases McCarthy at home take a firm—though unpopular—course in world affairs? Only time can tell, but we think the danger is just a little too close at the moment for the public to enjoy seeing the Democrats make an issue of the matter.

The verdict by the three-man loyalty board under Gordon Gray on Dr. Oppenheimer has not yet come in. The May issue of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* says: "We do not see how the treatment he has received can be justified." At his press conference last week Mr. Eisenhower made it pretty clear that the investigation was undertaken to head off a Congressional probe—presumably by McCarthy. Score another point for McCarthy. For various reasons Oppenheimer (and a majority of others in the secret conferences) opposed a "crash program" for making the H-bomb. Truman over-ruled them. The frightening thing about this *ex-post-facto* inquiry is that it means by implication, that the losers in any big strategy conference have their motives questioned. Pick the wrong side and your loyalty is examined. It is a new concept in American scientific thinking.

We are glad to report that NBC has rejected a new panel program proposed by Facts Forum, the expanding organ of H. L. Hunt, Texas multimillionaire sympathetic to McCarthy. Facts Forum now sponsors five radio and TV programs. The rejected program, says NBC, would have been for 15 minutes, with Facts Forum supplying discussion by an ostensible "conservative" and a "liberal." Experience teaches that as long as Facts Forum can pick the speakers the conservatives always get the best of it.

Notes: Ernest Hemingway had the opposite comment about poor Private Schine having to serve in the Army; Hemingway said, "What a fate for a professional loyal American!" . . . Every Secretary of the Treasury for a generation has urged plugging the tax loophole that gives a 27.5 percent oil depletion allowance and Sen. John J. Williams (R, Del.) now offers a bill to cut it to 15 percent; but Secretary Humphrey won't agree; he has set up a board to study the matter. . . . FBI Director Hoover complained to the Daughters of the American Revolution recently that attackers of Reds are targets of vile abuse; Hoover's own appearance before the Jenner Committee in the Harry Dexter White case is now sandwiched into a GOP documentary film, juxtaposed to "answer" Truman. . . . Ironic contrast to massive US news coverage of Joe's hassle with the Army; not a single editorial or report has yet appeared in any French newspaper. Not interested?

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Who Will Succeed Steve Mitchell?

PARTY chairmen have been known to make history by actually swinging the choice of nominees in Democratic National Conventions. Witness Chairman Robert Hannegan's surprise success in turning the 1944 Convention away from Henry Wallace to Harry Truman as the running mate for FDR. Major powers among the Democrats, therefore, are already showing intense interest in who is to succeed Chairman Stephen Mitchell when he resigns after November.

The most exclusive huddles in Washington hotel suites during this year's Jefferson-Jackson party meetings talked over possible alliances to capture the Chairmanship. The Democrat sages do not expect Mitchell to change his mind about quitting or to encourage a draft. Illinois politicians say that he will return home to become personal manager of Adlai Stevenson's bid for the Presidential nomination and perhaps later to make a personal try for his party's nomination as Governor of Illinois in 1956.

Mitchell, who has learned in his two years what influence a Chairman can have, will be tempted to try to pick his successor and to encourage Stevenson at least to assert a right of veto on the choice. But leaders who are not convinced that Stevenson is the best candidate for '56, are in a strong position to insist on a truly "uncommitted" Chairman to plan and preside over the next nominating convention. And both partisans of Stevenson and those determined to prevent his renomination are therefore looking over friends who might be passed off as "uncommitted" and available for the job.

Among those whose names are being put forward seriously are: former Price Administrator Michael Di Salle of Ohio; former Mutual Security Administrator Averell Harriman and former Air Secretary Thomas Finletter, both of New York; former Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman of Colorado; and former Senate Secretary Leslie Biffle of Arkansas.

Di Salle alone on this remaining list of contenders for a job by tradition reserved for Catholics is a member of that faith. The social and economic views of Harriman, Chapman and Di Salle are similarly New Deal. Those of Biffle resemble his friends' Senators Russell (Ga.) and Johnson (Tex.).

Three main blocs will operate in naming the new Chairman, assuming that Mr. Stevenson agrees to the propriety of a "free choice" to be made by the National Committee itself: (1) the big-city organization of the East and Midwest, (2) representatives of the less populous Mountain and Western States, (3) the Southerners. In the first group to make the choice a coalition is forming around Harry Truman of Missouri, Jacob Arvey of Illinois and David Lawrence of Pennsylvania. Mr. Di Salle has strong ties to this group as well as to supporters of Stevenson and Harriman. Chapman and Harriman both have remained on the friendliest terms with their old chief, Mr. Truman, as well as with Stevenson. But Leslie Biffle's relationship with the former President and his first assistant, Matt Connelly, goes much farther back; as Senate Secretary he made lasting friends in every group concerned in this party choice. Those who urge Biffle's selection will quote Stevenson-Mitchell doctrine when they argue that only a man who has the confidence of Democratic State leaders in the South can hold the party together for the unity needed to win.

The strategic problem facing Stevenson's friends is to produce a candidate more attractive to the Truman-city leader group than the South's man, Biffle.

Words But No Money

ADMINISTRATION spokesmen like to describe the current recession as a "readjustment"—"a return to normalcy," apparently—largely caused by a post-Korea cut in defense spending. There has not yet been any such cut. Actual defense spending during the Republican Administration's first 15 months in power has averaged $3.6 billion monthly—compared to the $3.4 billion average of the preceding 19 months.

Put simply, right now defense spending is at a post-World War II peak. The Republican cuts in the defense budget will begin to take effect around December of this year, and the cuts in the entire federal budget not long thereafter.

If we are in economic trouble now—and we are—what these cuts promise for the future hardly bears out Assistant Commerce Secretary Lothair Teetor's assurance that "we are just about ready for another advance," given last week to delegates at the annual meeting of the US Chamber of Commerce. Nor does the fact that the Studebaker Corporation and the Pennsylvania Railroad both are unable to declare a dividend for the first quarter of this year. Studebaker's production is running at half the 1953 rate, and Pennsylvania's losses for the first quarter of this year are close to $10 million.

Oregon Rough-Stuff

ALTHOUGH the election is still six months away, anti-Semitism is already being used against State Sen. Richard Neuberger, Democratic nominee for the US Senate, who is running substantially ahead of isolationist Sen. Guy Cordon in early straw polls.

A small weekly in the hinterland of the state wrote a bitter denunciation of Neuberger in which it referred to "the well-known wisdom of his race in financial matters." The editorial was distributed throughout the state by the Cordon-for-Senator headquarters. The *Coos Bay Daily Times* claimed that the weekly had "brought into the campaign a note of bigotry and the Cordon Committee has seen fit to broadcast that bigotry. Both of them deserve the severest condemnation."

A leading Republican paper, the *Register-Guard* of Eugene, went further in sharply rebuking the Cordon-for-

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Senator Committee for circulating anti-Semitic material against Neuberger.

At approximately the same time that religious bigotry is being injected into the Oregon contest, stories are appearing in the press that President Eisenhower intends to lend his prestige and support to the hard-pressed Cordon. It will be extremely significant if the President, who speaks of tolerance and understanding so frequently, gives his blessing to a campaign which so unabashedly tries to make political capital out of the fact that the Democratic adversary is a Jew.

"Responsible People"

MOST OF the people of Summit, New Jersey, own attractive homes, earn a considerable amount of money and vote Republican, but, as one citizen put it recently, "Republican with a conscience." For a number of years this conscience has found partial expression in an active interest in international affairs. In the Summit schools students have been taught a "world outlook"; they have adopted European war orphans, and have contributed to emergency fund-raising campaigns like the one for Dutch flood victims. Until recently some 700 students of the Summit Junior High School customarily recited the pledge to the flag, then followed it with their school pledge, which said in part, "I, a student of the Summit Junior High School and a future citizen of the world, promise to obey and uphold the laws of my country and school."

Early last November the Beacon Hill Post No. 190, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Summit, complained about this pledge: "We feel that such a pledge is clearly un-American and unpatriotic . . . delete the offending phrase. . . ."

On November 10, Robert E. Woodward, Junior High School principal, wrote the VFW post that the phrase "a citizen of the world" had been deleted, though he added, "I disagree with you that there is anything un-American or unpatriotic about the phrase in question."

Neither the VFW's letter nor Woodward's reply had been made public until the *Newark News* heard of the incident and published a story about it. The Associated Press picked up the story and carried it throughout the country. The *New York Post*, the *New Yorker* magazine and radio news commentator John W. Vandercook criticized the actions of both the VFW and Woodward.

VFW members were embarrassed by the publicity, but felt that the excitement would die down. They were to be surprised. As news of the deletion spread through the town, opposition arose.

On December 15 the Council of Churches, representing Summit's Protestants, urged that "the original thought . . . be restored at the earliest practicable date." January 18 the school's Parent-Teacher Association said the deletion had "scarred the pledge through deliberate removal of words intended to emphasize a broad outlook in world affairs." The League of Women Voters, Summit chapter, said on January 25, "the deletion of the phrase 'a future citizen of the world' removes the feeling of affirmation from a philosophy that we consider very important." Other expressions of disapproval were received from the YWCA and a newly-formed chapter of Americans for Democratic Action (headed by a Republican).

The VFW has replied to the protests privately by hinting that the PTA, the League of Women Voters, the YMCA and the Council of Churches contain subversive elements and publicly by threatening court action if the disputed phrase or any like it is restored. VFW members claim the support of the local American Legion and both Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution but such support has not been expressed openly. Recently the VFW had trouble with its own organization. The East Orange VFW post was prepared to censure the Summit post and was kept from doing so only by a last-minute plea.

At the request of the PTA the pledge has been resubmitted to a faculty group for study of possible alternatives to "a future citizen of the world." If similar phrasing should be adopted and the VFW once again raises its voice in protest, the PTA, Council of Churches and League of Women Voters are ready to renew the fight. They feel that town opinion is overwhelmingly with them and they know that more is at stake than a few words of a pledge. A member of one of these groups has said, "If we give in on this point, they'll be back next year hammering away at the curriculum or the teachers, and we have all seen where that can lead."

Shelving Our Illusions

THE ADMINISTRATION has been forced to abandon a number of illusions about the Indo-Chinese war. Now, reports from Geneva indicate that it has given up hope that all of Indo-China can be held for the West. These facts are now admitted: the war must not be lost if Southeast Asia, Japan and the Philippines are to be protected against the Communist conquest; yet that war cannot be won without a US military commitment so great that Russia would be tempted to strike in Europe and the Middle East. The job at Geneva, for the West, is, therefore, to find a solution which will neither abandon the

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area nor force us to try to win the war Whether such a solution can be found and made to stick will depend largely upon political decisions by the White House and on Capitol Hill.

Only a strong and independent national state in Indo-China could have presented the West with the means to deny the entire peninsula to Communism. The last real chance to create such a nation over French protests was lost when Franklin D. Roosevelt died; with him went the determinaton to place Indo-China under an international trusteeship. Present US plans seem to call for sitting on the sidelines at Geneva while the other principals try to arrange a truce based on partition. The role of the US delegation, at this point, apparently is one of trying to influence possible truce terms by letting it be known that this country will join in military guarantees for a new frontier in Indo-China only if "satisfactory safeguards" against future Communist expansion are included.

If Indo-China *is* partitioned and a Communist state created in its Northeast corner, along the Chinese border, the remaining area would not stand one chance of survival unless its independence and territorial integrity were guaranteed by some one nation or a group of nations disposing of vast military power. Knowing that no one nation will take on such a commitment, Dulles wants a NATO-like association of Pacific nations to assume the responsibility for preventing further Communist expansion in Asia. The effectiveness of such an alliance—and of its guarantees to nations like Indo-China—will depend upon the extent of US participation. And the extent as well as the quality of US participation will depend upon whether enough Republicans *and* Democrats can forswear short-range political advantage for long-range national security.

A truce in Indo-China based, as it must be, on give-and-take with the Communists, will be denounced by isolationists in the President's party. To resist them, Eisenhower will need the support of the Democrats. But if Eisenhower permits his party to continue hanging the label "betrayal" and "appeasement" on the Democratic record, not all Democrats will resist the temptation to return the attack by blasting the Administration's policy on Indo-China. If this happens, only the isolationists can benefit.

While You Weren't Looking

Somebody's Income Went Up in '53

SINCE June, 1953, unemployment has risen by more than two billion, payrolls in commodity-producing industries have been cut by some $6 billion annually, and farm assets have declined by $9 billion. But during 1953 the *net* income of lending corporations—banks, insurance companies, etc.—rose 11 to 20 percent.

And the *Journal of Commerce*—April 2, 1954, reports that "the increase in 1954 first quarter *net* as contrasted with the 1953 period ranged from 5 to 14 percent for the first banks reporting."

Charging the Administration with a fiscal policy "which has resulted in a gigantic transfer of income from borrowers—who need it for investments, expansion, productivity and jobs—to the lenders who have money aplenty," Sen. Hubert Humphrey tried to direct public attention to these facts. But the newspapers ignored him.

Bank's preliminary summary of net income of lending corporations for the years 1952 and 1953

Industrial groups	Number of companies	Reported net income after taxes (millions of dollars) 1952	1953	Change
Commercial banks	328	$598	$662	+11%
Fire and casualty insurance	22	57	68	+20
Investment trusts	173	249	278	+12
Sales finance	61	110	126	+15
Total	584	1,013	1,134	+12

A New Power Empire May Arise

THE SKULLDUGGERY of such vast power monopolies as Samuel Insull's more than two decades ago, led to a law controlling "holding companies"—keystones of monopolies. Now, although it has not been reported in the press, the Eisenhower Administration is thinking of breaching that law. And the excuse—again—is "creeping socialism" and "defense needs."

The idea is to amend the Public Utility Act of 1935 so that utilities can join forces to build power plants and sell electricity to one or more parent or holding companies.

What the utilities want is a change in the law permitting as normal business the kind of power projects allowed on an emergency basis during the Korean War in order to supply new Atomic Energy Commission plants in Kentucky and Ohio. In one of these emergency projects, 16 private utilities combined to form the Ohio Valley Electric Company, to serve the AEC at Portsmouth, Ohio. In the other, five utility companies joined to form Electric Energy, Inc., to supply some of the power for Paducah, Ky., plant.

Both of these war babies are considered forerunners of the programs President Eisenhower has in mind when he speaks of partnership between the federal government and local power interests.

It has been shown that power produced by private utilities will cost AEC more than TVA power. But the Administration feels that the difference should be written off as a minor expense in the fight against "creeping socialism."

The Administration plan is being discussed in a number of executive agencies, as well as in the Republican cloakrooms on Capitol Hill. The exact line of approach has not yet been determined, but an opening move has been made by Chairman Charles A. Wolverton (R, N.J.) of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. He has introduced an amendment to the Public Utility Act exempting from federal regulation any electric company "all of whose outstanding voting securities are owned by one or more electric utility companies and which sells its electric energy only to one or more of the companies owning its voting securities."

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"The Senator is not so much on trial as he is on exhibition"—*Joseph Harsch* / "Disgraceful and damaging as is the whole squalid business, it would only make matters infinitely worse to close down or to interrupt the hearings"—*Walter Lippmann* / "When McCarthy threatened to resume his seat and his vote on the Committee he strengthened a suspicion that he is never going to take the stand on oath . . ."—*Elmer Davis*

Trial by Television

I. THE ORDEAL OF STEVENS

AT THE END of the fifth day of hearings the guards closed the oaken doors on the stragglers leaving the Senate Caucus Room. Inside, the last of the cameramen rewound his reels, and Ray Jenkins, the Committee Counsel, pleaded a little desperately with Robert Kennedy, Counsel for the Minority, and James Juliana, a gum-chewing assistant of Roy Cohn's. The sudden emptiness of the great room laid bare, beneath the tables and overturned chairs, the day's quota of flash bulbs, cigarette butts, empty glasses, spilled ash trays, mimeographed bulletins and crumpled sheets of yellow scrap paper piled in disorder beneath the stately chandeliers.

Outside in the marble halls the community of the day broke up and went its ways. The mild little man who was head of the United States Army headed for the Pentagon, trembling with exhaustion. The members of the Senate Subcommittee returned to their offices, rubbed raw and sore. The newspapermen went disconsolately down Pennsylvania Avenue to sort out scribbled notes of testimony. The crowd of spectators wandered off on its weary way. And no wonder. Whether or not all the soldiers at Fort Dix, with the exception of Private Schine, were loaded like cattle in open trucks as Mr. Jenkins asserted, the 700 civilians were certainly packed like cattle in the Senate Caucus Room.

Beyond the physical weariness there was a mental weariness caused by the Committee's procedure of returning over and over to each Senator for what Sen. Karl Mundt (R, S.D.) called "another turn of the wheel." Beyond this weariness there was a mood of frustration, caused by the sordid nature of the charges and countercharges. And beyond all of these there was an unpleasant taste in the mouth—caused by five days of intimate association with the dominating and repellent personality of Joseph McCarthy.

As usual Senator McCarthy turned even this revulsion against himself to his own use. He interrupted continuously to denounce all interruptions. He broke up every line of argument with points of order, and went on to make his own arguments, all "highly important." He drove the inquiry into the swamps and forests of motives and side associations and kept it there by making every comment a personal slur that no honorable man could suffer in silence. With one eye on a distant clock in the fading light, he spun out the inquiry with entertaining diversions on the names, ranks and seating arrangements of Secretary Stevens' legal staff.

So Senator McCarthy brought the hearings over and over to a halt. Then he denounced them for lack of progress and waste of time. Why, he demanded, should the time of Generals, of Senators, of his staff and himself, hot as they were on the trail of a hundred Fifth Amendment Communists, be taken up with the affairs of one Army private, so favored at McCarthy's insistence apparently that after months in the Army he had risen from private—to private! The Hearst press, with its syndicated news service and its columnists, echoed and built up on Senator McCarthy's line. And some well-meaning newspapers re-echoed the echo in concern for our allies, quoting the hostile reaction of the *London Daily Mirror,* as if this vulgar tabloid spoke for the British nation. The President also felt that the hearings should be ended. All this, Senator McCarthy assumed, played into his hands. With obvious relish he announced that he might need to cross-examine Secretary Stevens for days, and had numberless witnesses of his own.

IF THE HEARINGS were a waste of time, then the waste of course was caused by Senator McCarthy. But they were not a waste and they were not taken up with unimportant issues. Al Capone went to jail on charges of income-tax evasion, and Alger Hiss was convicted of perjury. But these were not the issues. Nor were the antics of one narcissistic private the subject of inquiry in the present hearings. The issue was the important one, of abuse by a United States Senator of the tremendous powers of harassment conferred upon him by the Senate. The inquiry embraced McCarthyism, and reached beyond

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it to all the encroachments of the Executive power carried on by irresponsible Congressional Committees.

Reluctantly, and very late, a Committee of the Senate was standing back and looking at what one Senator had been doing in its name.

Laboriously, the Committee struggled along like a miner in a three-foot vein. The Committee members, like Senator Symington, had borne burdens of tremendous responsibility at critical times, yet rarely had they suffered so—and in a cause which, from a partisan view, was not theirs at all. Joseph McCarthy alone was more active than all of them together, and more purposeful. How could he stand the strain? In some obscure way he seemed to love tension, to feed on conflict, to draw nourishment, as a sadist might from inflicting punishment and, as a masochist, to derive pleasure from being hated and feared. His jaw set grimly when the Committee Counsel told how Private Schine had informed the officers at Fort Dix that he was there to modernize and streamline the Army. In the uproar of laughter that followed, McCarthy and Cohn directed set smiles to the television camera whose flashing red bulb indicated that it was in use. The smiles were two seconds too late to be convincing. But when the outraged spectators applauded Struve Hensel's defense of his dignity against McCarthy's slur, the Senator grinned at them without resentment.

Generally however, McCarthy was ill-tempered. He seemed to know that he should never have permitted himself to be caught defending the privileges gained for the spoiled son of a millionaire. Yet when the hearings started the showman rose in him and he had to take command.

As a showman, certainly, he was superb. Each afternoon he appeared newly shaven, his face caked in a cream-colored makeup that from nearby gave a startling, feminine aspect to his florid jowls. He alone enjoyed the hearings. It was "Bob" at all times to the man he was destroying. And he could slip a knife into any man as he patted him on the back. His deliberate humor, as when he tried to ridicule by overstatement the privileges granted to Private Schine, was heavy handed and dreadful. On these occasions McCarthy alone snickered at his own humor. In contrast, his capacity to seize evidence and twist it was beyond the power of anyone in the room.

WHEN Secretary Stevens, almost in tears, pleaded necessity of respecting the rights of men innocent until proved guilty, McCarthy turned this quietly against the Secretary by comparing this plea with the charges against Frank Carr. When Ray Jenkins asserted that the soldiers at Fort Dix were packed like cattle, it was McCarthy who at once protested in the name of the mothers of America against this slur on the Army's treatment of their dear sons. And when it developed without warning that Private Schine had been meeting in the evenings with the McCarthy Subcommittee staff, the Senator without pausing launched an attack on the Army for shadowing innocent men.

In showmanship McCarthy stood alone. In developing argument he relied heavily and conspicuously on Roy Cohn. Leaning across him as McCarthy reared back to listen, and posing pensively when the cameras turned upon him, Cohn might have been cast in terra cotta holding a bird bath on his head in an overgrown garden. No need for him to shave twice daily and cover with make-up his blackening beard. He seemed more like a cherub gone to seed; his cheeks puffed, his mouth turned down at the corners; his complexion sallow, his black hair matted down, and the purses forming under his eyes. Far-fetched, the audience might think, were the charges that this boy who spoke with his mouth open, and his tongue laid out on his lower lip could be the one whom the Army charged had used "extremely abusive and threatening language" . . . in an effort to obtain special privileges for Private Schine and who had sworn that he would "cause the discharge of Secretary Stevens" and that he would cause the Subcommittee to "wreck the Army" if Private Schine were sent overseas. And yet it was not so far-fetched. Cohn, like McCarthy, betrayed on occasions curious flashes of sadism. Thus when the exhausted Secretary Stevens wandered from the witness stand after six days, with all but McCarthy voicing sympathy, Cohn told a television interviewer with obvious pleasure that he would never take refuge in pleas of exhaustion when it came to his turn.

There is a line in Ford Maddox Ford's novel *Parade's End* about the school boy of the Sixth Form: "sinister, hobbledehoy, waiting in the corners of playgrounds to torture someone weak and unfortunate." So the Senate Caucus Room seemed to be the playground, McCarthy and Cohn the bullies of the Sixth Form, and Robert Stevens, pink-faced and chubby, the weak and unfortunate one, cornered, frightened, forced to fight.

The Secretary was at all times at a disadvantage. The solid testimony on his side was to be given, if given at all, by John Adams against whom the full force of Roy Cohn's arrogance had been brought. The weighty evidence, if there was to be weighty evidence, would come in the transcripts of telephone conversations between Adams and Cohn. Those were the promises that were convincing, the charges that were hard and fast in the Army brief.

In contrast, the charges which Secretary Stevens had to defend lay hidden in the shadows. They were that, on many occasions and often in the presence of Senator McCarthy, Roy Cohn had linked the Committee's investigations of the Army to the Army's treatment of Private Schine. On each occasion, as the Army brief conceded, the relation between the demand and the threat was not specific, but was established by "inference and innuendo."

Where, in these charges and counter-charges could the truth be found? The dilemma of Secretary Stevens,

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which for Senator McCarthy was no dilemma but an opportunity to create further confusion, was stated allegorically in conversation by one lawyer:

> You are driving in a restricted zone and a policeman draws up beside you and cries "pull over!" He takes out his book and licks his pencil, and says "you were speeding!" You deny it and then the policeman says: I just thought you weren't by any chance speeding on your way to the policeman's ball, were you?" You gulp and stammer—"well maybe I was"—so he sells you a ticket for $20 and arrests you anyway. The case goes to court, and you protest—the policeman answers that you were trying to blackmail him. You know he's wrong—but how do you prove blackmail? And what is evidence acceptable to the Court?

This then was a hard case for any lawyer to argue. And Robert Stevens lacked even a lawyer's approach. The events in which he was caught were beyond him. Surrounded by Generals, (as McCarthy loved to point out) and helped as far as he could be by the Senators of the opposition party, he seemed nonetheless alone in the crowd and the glare. The jaw and hands of Ray Jenkins protruded toward him from the Committee table, taxing his ebbing vitality and torturing his memory. In all but the ultimate court of public opinion he was at a fearful disadvantage.

Secretary Stevens gave the impression of honesty but yet he was not wholly honest in failing to concede that in a deep sense he was guilty. He had gone too far in giving in to Senator McCarthy and in granting to Private Schine the favors which, later, he was asking the Senate to condemn. It was Secretary Stevens who had telegraphed Senator McCarthy to assure him of his loyalty and co-operation and Stevens who had sought McCarthy out, granting him little favors of plane rides and membership in luncheon clubs. It was Stevens who had, to the horror of his aides, apologized to Cohn after Cohn had cursed and threatened in a fit of rage. It was Stevens who had been ready to meet Dave, who had gone to the Waldorf Towers apartment of Dave's parents, who flew McCarthy and Cohn to Fort Dix so that they could see Dave one autumn afternoon. It was surely plausible, as McCarthy, Cohn and Schine affirmed and Stevens so tentatively denied, that he had asked for the picture standing in front of his plane.

Counsel Cohn

It seemed incredible to the Senate Committee, six months later, that the Secretary of the Army should have done these things. In part their implied criticism was wholly unfair. It was the failure of the Senate to curb the man who spoke in its name that permitted Senator McCarthy to cut his path through the Pentagon. And it was the refusal of President Eisenhower to assert his Constitutional obligation of protecting the Executive power against encroachment, his repudiation of all who challenged Senator McCarthy in 1953, that paved the road down which McCarthy advanced. Yet beyond this the Secretary himself was responsible. He made his decision to pay McCarthy's price for peace; he asked Senator McCarthy for favors in Congressional investigations and McCarthy granted them; he occupied his powerful post in the summer and fall of 1953, in the happy illusion that the Senator was a close confidant and trustworthy friend.

It was a terrible error as Secretary Stevens was to learn, but Senator McCarthy in turn was not quite sure how to exploit it when the break finally came. If Secretary Stevens' explanation of the treatment given to Private Schine was contradictory, so also was Senator McCarthy's.

The documents released by Senator McCarthy on March 12 set forth the claim that Private Schine had suffered, not benefited, from his association with the Senate Subcommittee. In a memorandum allegedly written on December 9, Frank Carr complained to McCarthy: "I am getting fed up with the way the Army is trying to use Schine as a hostage to pressure us to stop our hearings on the Army. I thought it wasn't fair for them to take it out on Schine."

But this promising line of mistreatment became untenable as *Life, Time* and the *New York Post* published accounts of the unprecedented favors that Private Schine was in fact receiving. McCarthy dismissed these stories as fabrications by "Drew Pearson and the left-wing press." But Ray Jenkins, the Committee Counsel, had obviously substantiated them. So McCarthy shifted his ground. He held instead that Private Schine was the unwilling object of favors pressed upon him by Secretary Stevens in a vain effort to buy off the McCarthy Subcommittee. This line was apparently swallowed whole, or at least given a full field trial by Ray Jenkins. McCarthy had insisted that Stevens had asked to be photographed with Dave.

And so the moment came late on the third day when Mr. Jenkins led Secretary Stevens to deny that he had said: "I want my picture taken with David," and then brandished in his face a picture of the two together.

When the hearing reopened on the fourth day, Joseph Welch, Special Counsel for Secretary Stevens, was able to show that the photograph was cropped from a group picture, and that Mr. Jenkins had been tricked. At that, the grin disappeared from Senator McCarthy's face. He broke in crying that Mr. Welch was "lying," shouting "Oh, be quiet!" to Senator Symington, and muttering "I am getting awfully sick of sitting down here at the end of the table. . . ."

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It turned out that Mr. Cohn had given the cropped photograph to Mr. Jenkins, and so he was called to the stand. Smooth and sincere, he talked all around the photograph. At last, under oath, he swore that he had no idea that the photograph was cropped when he gave it to the Committee Counsel. He did concede that the original photograph sent by Schine included other people. He did concede that it was cropped by a member of his staff. He didn't know who it was. He'd never been down in the room where the prints were made.

Finally it was the turn of Mr. Welch:

MR. WELCH: Mr. Cohn, I assume you would like it understood that although I sit at the same table, I am not your counsel.

MR. COHN: There is not a statement that has been made at this hearing with which I am in more complete agreement. . . . Roy Cohn is here speaking for Roy Cohn, to give the facts. I have no counsel and I feel the need of none.

MR. WELCH: In all modesty, sir, I am content that it should appear from my end that I am not your counsel.



Private Schine

Cohn joined a little later in the laughter and the cross-examination continued. Mr. Welch asked for the photograph. Mr. Cohn had agreed that it was a picture of Private Schine and Secretary Stevens smiling at each other. Mr. Welch suggested that Secretary Stevens was not smiling and might well be looking at the third man, Colonel Bradley:

MR. WELCH: I think I observe on Colonel Bradley's face a faint look of pleasure. Do you, sir?

MR. COHN: I would say I know that Colonel Bradley had a good steak dinner shortly afterwards. Maybe he was anticipating it. . . .

MR. WELCH: If Bradley is feeling good about a steak dinner, Schine must be considering a whole haunch of beef.

For once, in the five days, there was a sense of enjoyment and relief.

* * *

Then the ordeal of Secretary Stevens was on again. There was the brutal impatience of Mr. Jenkins to contend with; the probing questions of Senator Potter; the softly laid traps of Senator Dirksen; the harshness of Chairman Mundt in pressing and pressing on the single point of the inclusion of Frank Carr in the Army brief. Only the Democrats came to his rescue, alone in the crowded room, and once in every hour it was again Senator McCarthy's turn. Then the arm would lock itself around the neck of Secretary Stevens and tighten and tighten until as the blood drained from his head and his mind went blank, he would hear the distant voice of Senator Mundt declaring that the hold must be broken because the Senator's ten minutes were up.

Through the first day Secretary Stevens held his own. The second day was relieved for him by Senator McCarthy's outburst of fear and anger on learning that records of telephone conversations had been kept by the Army. But on the third day a concerted drive developed against a weak point in the Stevens testimony. Carr certainly was an accomplice in all that Roy Cohn did. And when Secretary Stevens faltered on the fourth day and could not provide specific examples of Carr's complicity, a Democrat, Senator Jackson was able to rescue him by quoting from a memorandum from Carr, on which the McCarthy charge of blackmail was based. But Secretary Stevens was on shifting sands.

Then there was another weakness in Stevens' case, which happily for him the Senators did not find.

On November 6, 1953, Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn and Mr. Carr met with Secretary Stevens. They asked him to assign Private Schine to New York City, and they coupled this request, according to the Army, with promises to limit or end the investigation of Fort Monmouth. In his version of the same meeting, Frank Carr maintains that Secretary Stevens urged them to hold up the Monmouth hearings and promised to make Private Schine available for Committee work. This much accords in both stories and is not denied. But the following day, according to testimony, Secretary Stevens learned that the Committee's plea for Private Schine was a cover—Dave needed the week-ends, said Senator McCarthy, to take care of his girl friends.

At that moment, Secretary Stevens was on notice that Senator McCarthy was exploiting him. A strong executive leader would have cancelled the privileges of Private Schine, demanding Committee affidavits for each requested leave. But Secretary Stevens was not a strong executive. So he sanctioned the deception. He ordered General Ryan at Fort Dix that Private Schine should be released for Committee work; and he took the position that it was not for him to determine what Private Schine did in or out of Fort Dix.

He was weak, but there was reason for Secretary Stevens' weakness at that moment. Senator McCarthy was ripping up Fort Monmouth, demoralizing a vital base, frightening an entire nation and turning scientists further against government service.

No new evidence of importance was developed by the McCarthy hearings at Fort Monmouth. The majority of the witnesses called had little or no present connection with the Army's Signal Corps. It seems possible that there was espionage committed at Monmouth during the Second World War and the facts were developed by Army Intelligence. But the House Un-American Activities Committee, in its findings on Monmouth in 1952, had reported that the files, made available by Army In-

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telligence, "indicated that little tangible evidence indicative of espionage or subversive activities had been developed by the military investigation."

Yet Senator McCarthy went to Monmouth on October 8, and began at once from his secret sessions to leak sensational and wholly inaccurate scare stories. He had, he implied, established at Fort Monmouth "all the earmarks of extremely dangerous espionage." And for days he built on this theme, tying existing spy rings at Monmouth to Julius Rosenberg and Alger Hiss.

AGAIN the initial error of Stevens was to give in to McCarthy. Anxiously he toured the base with McCarthy on October 20, and at once suspended 12 scientists and engineers. Thirty-five in all were suspended and then, as McCarthy went wild the Secretary began to retrace his ground. He announced three weeks after his action that the Army had been unable to find anything resembling espionage at Monmouth; that every suspect had denied under oath membership in the Communist Party; that no witness had cited the Fifth Amendment and that some suspects were being reinstated. At that time and very privately, he asked Senator McCarthy to suspend his hearings so that the Army could finish its survey. He promised to report back to the Senator; and the Senator apparently co-operated. But out of that action came McCarthy's principal counter-charge.

On the fourth day of hearings McCarthy pressed a tired Stevens on his inconclusive answers. The exchange continued:

SENATOR MCCARTHY: Now, can you tell us today whether or not you wanted the hearings at Fort Monmouth suspended?

SECRETARY STEVENS: I wanted them suspended in order that the Army could carry out the hearings themselves and stop the panic that was being created in the minds of the public on a basis that was not justified by the facts.

SENATOR MCCARTHY: How did you finally succeed in getting the hearing suspended?

SECRETARY STEVENS: How did I succeed?

SENATOR MCCARTHY: Yes, they are suspended as of today. How did you succeed?

SECRETARY STEVENS: They aren't suspended as far as I know.

SENATOR MCCARTHY: Bob, don't give me that. You know that the hearings were suspended the day you or someone filed your charges against Mr. Cohn, Mr. Carr and myself . . . let's not be coy.

Secretary Stevens could only stammer that the charge was unfair and untrue.

Very well, Senator McCarthy had further evidence to present; Stevens had persecuted the Commanding General at Fort Monmouth, General Kirke Lawton, because he had refused to be soft on Communists and had co-operated with McCarthy. Stevens denied it.

But he was in trouble. Lawton, if the memorandum from Frank Carr was accurate, had begun by declining to welcome McCarthy's excursion to Monmouth. Then he reversed himself. Subsequently McCarthy praised him because, "When he found any person suspected of Communist activities, he immediately suspended them thus removing them from the handling of secret material."

Senator McCarthy quoted further the reply of General Lawton to his question why employees suspected of Communist activities were not suspended three, four or five years ago:

"Under the old Administration we could not suspend them . . . if we got by the first Army Loyalty Board, which was difficult, then they would appeal to the appeals board in the Pentagon."

Evidently the General's complaint was that men accused employed the due process provided them. Senator McCarthy added of General Lawton's attitude to reinstatement of employees with pay:

"The General also said he did not want them to have vacations with pay at government expense."

Subsequently, in an exhaustive report, a subcommittee of the Federation of American Scientists reviewed the charges against the men suspended without pay by General Lawton. They included membership in the American Veterans Committee, forwarding a letter to the editor of a scientific journal, and belief in the writings of Max Lerner. The Scientists' committee concluded:

"Of over 120 charges against 19 employees which were analyzed in detail, only six involved Communist membership or affiliations, five of which were denied under oath: the sixth was an admission of attending Communist meetings with the employee's mother at the age of 12 or 13."

Evidently, the Scientists added, loyalty at Fort Monmouth was a one-way affair. The scientists were to be loyal to Lawton, he failed to defend them against unjust attack.

Yet the community was up in arms—car pools were broken up which included the suspects, milk bottles were not picked up by neighbors when the suspended families left for week ends. Children were persecuted at schools. So John Adams apparently asked General Lawton to reinstate some of the suspects pending a full investigation. General Lawton apparently refused, and instead publicly held that the City College of New York was suspected as a source of subversion. Stevens then considered transferring General Lawton. He decided against this course, but once again he had confided in his friend McCarthy.

On this issue, McCarthy gave Stevens his most terrible hour. Not only McCarthy but the Committee Counsel and the majority seemed to be against him on the one issue on which he had been right. Ray Jenkins adopted completely the McCarthy line. The Secretary's attitude to General Lawton, he argued, was of decisive importance; he referred to all 35 suspects at Monmouth simply as "subversives." He insisted and made Stevens insist that "time was of the essence" in driving them from public service. He held, and the majority of the

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Committee seemed to agree, that the test of Stevens' devotion to his country was not how well he had upheld the Constitutional rights of due process, but how many suspects he had fired without due process.

When Jenkins had driven this point as far as he could, Stevens seemed close to collapse. He tried continuously to explain his position. He was given no chance. Then it was McCarthy's turn, and again McCarthy pressed him. Pressing one line to a dead end of incoherence, he tried another. And at last, in a faltering voice, Stevens in the week's most touching moment stated his view. The official transcript reads:

SECRETARY STEVENS: What I had in mind was to try to convey to the Committee in probably rather tired language . . .

SENATOR MCCARTHY: Uh-uh.

SECRETARY STEVENS: The idea that in carrying out this job and doing it right for the American people and always resolving doubt in favor of the American people, that at the same time we ought not to be unfair or work hardship on individuals unnecessarily.

SENATOR MCCARTHY: That's fine sentiment. Let me . . .

At last McCarthy returned to his major charge. Stevens had released the original John Adams file on Private Schine in an effort to force the suspension of the McCarthy investigations. Secretary Stevens answered that the first Army report was prepared in answer to a letter from Senator Potter requesting all information in the case of Private Schine. The report, he felt, could not be held responsible for the suspension of the McCarthy Subcommittee investigations.

SENATOR MCCARTHY: Let's be a little more honest . . . you know that Mr. Adams had told me Cohn had indicated that . . . unless our hearings were called off . . . there would be aired a report attacking my chief counsel . . ."

By February, 1954, Senator McCarthy had moved into the case of Major Irving Peress. Riding it hard he had summoned General Ralph Zwicker, Commanding Officer at Camp Kilmer, and told him that he was a disgrace to the uniform of the United States. By then the story of Private Schine's career at Fort Dix had been independently and fully reported by the press. And by then the Army had gathered its records and was preparing to assert its authority. Still believing that Senator McCarthy was an honorable man, Secretary Stevens tried to reach a compromise with him over luncheon, only to hear the compromise presented as total surrender. So it was, but from then on for reasons that need no apology, Robert Stevens chose to act as Secretary of the Army and at last to fight back.

So the file was mentioned widely, and so the fight began. But fighting was no pastime for Secretary Stevens. By noon on the sixth day, it was clear that he was all in. His voice broke, tears all but started from his eyes. He could no longer defend himself against the onslaught of



Mr. Jenkins. Gently and movingly, Joseph Welch intervened:

"I am informed, Mr. Jenkins, that you have tried many murder trials and with great success. But may I remind you, my friend, that this is not a murder trial and that you are examining the Secretary of the Army."

At that moment Symington, Jackson and McClellan moved to spare him. Mr. Jenkins agreed, and Senator McCarthy alone remained. The Senator saw no reason why Secretary Stevens should be permitted to stand down "in order to regroup his forces and discuss matters further with his Counsel." Only if Mr. Stevens would claim physical exhaustion as his reason would the Senator let him go. At that Mr. Welch demurred. He conferred in a whisper with Stevens and reported that the Secretary would not "ask for quarter" but "would prefer to go on rather than see any signal flag go up of any lack of courage on his part." But at last the Secretary stepped down and up to the witness stand came the handsome and confident David Schine.

So, FOR the moment, the ordeal of Secretary Stevens was interrupted. But the impact of his ordeal remained. Roy Cohn was very much concerned with the fate of Frank Carr. He testified that Carr had been reluctant to join forces with the McCarthy Committee and that as the result of "The type of smear and the type of lies to which he has been subjected in this hearing and by this report, I certainly think that any good American is going to think twice before sticking his neck out in that way."

Senator Symington was touched by this answer. He felt then the heavy cost of the inquiry, and the whole ordeal that the little textile manufacturer had suffered. He feared that these televised hearings would bring home as nothing previously had done the terrible human cost for any man who dares in 1954 to enter public life. So Senator Symington asked Mr. Cohn:

"Do you believe that the same problems which apply to Mr. Carr . . . from the standpoint of the desirability of Washington service in these grave days will also apply as the result of the problems that have come up for Mr. Stevens since he took this job?"

To this Mr. Cohn as always had a ready answer:

"We did not make these charges, these smear charges against Mr. Stevens. He made them against us. I assume no responsibility in that regard."

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Anti-Communist . . . BUT!

The Republican "Soft" Approach to Strengthening the Free World

by Samuel P. Hayes Jr.

THE GREATEST threat of Communism today is *not* that head-on military collision will occur, nor that the declared Communists will defeat the declared anti-Communists in that clash. Those great threats are diminishing as the awful potential of damage to both sides becomes more apparent. The greatest threat to American security today is that the changes now going on inside the uncommitted countries will be manipulated by Communists or mishandled by others so that these countries will capitulate to Communist leadership.

The world conflict with Communism must not be treated, as the Republicans are apparently treating it, solely as a race to see who can build the biggest fort, with the biggest guns, the fastest. It is a tug-of-war to see *where* the forts will be built and *which way* the guns will be pointed if a military showdown ever comes.

What the US needs is a positive program for "dynamic security." Such security can only be built by growth and changes within the countries of the free world leading to greater production and consumption, a wider diffusion of income and political power, fuller participation by the citizens in orderly political processes, strengthening of democratic values, broadening of individual freedom and opportunity, and consequently greater indigenous military strength. *The most effective anti-Communist program for the US Government would therefore be to encourage, promote and, to the extent feasible and necessary finance this kind of growth and change.*

Let us consider briefly what an effective economic program for "dynamic security" would look like, and compare it with the Administration's newly announced program:

1. *Expand US imports much faster than exports.* This would reduce the drag on world trade caused by the dollar gap and would help other nations finance their own development. Such expansion would require, particularly in a period of reduced stockpiling and general business activity, unilateral and deep cuts in or complete elimination of most tariffs.

The Eisenhower program falls far short of this. The President says:

> If we fail in our trade policy, we may fail in all. Our domestic economy, our standard of living, our security, and the solidarity of the free world—all are involved.

Yet all he *advocates* on tariffs is a "gradual and selective revision . . . through the tested method of negotiations with other nations" (in other words, through bilateral or multilateral agreements that may boost our exports as much as our imports).

Even if the Congress approves all Eisenhower's recommendations on reduction of trade barriers, which is highly unlikely, the effect on the dollar gap is likely to be nil. The modest filip to imports that would result will probably be more than offset by reduced demand resulting from lower stockpiling and business activity, and by some increase in exports to nations with which we negotiate reciprocal tariff reductions.

2. *Reduce markedly the great fluctuations in demand and prices for food and raw materials which have upset the economies of the under-developed countries for decades.* One of the insistent demands of Latin American countries at Caracas was for US action to meet this problem. Effective action must include an aggressive program of negotiation of commodity agreements, of building up buffer stocks, of making long-term purchase agreements, or other arrangements which go beyond traditional commercial considerations and give adequate weight to the security interest of the United States in stabilizing and developing the economies of the producing countries.

This problem is vital to countries in highly strategic areas of the world, such as Indonesia, Malaya, Indo-China and the Philippines, as well as in Latin America. Yet what does Eisenhower propose? Only a vague engagement to make "a constructive contribution . . . by moderating or relaxing impediments to international trade, by encouraging diversification of foreign econ-

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Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., as special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, supervised the introduction of the Point Four program. He later served as Assistant Director for the Far East in the MSA.

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omies, by avoiding procurement practices which disturb world prices, by consultation with other nations, and by tempering the fluctuations in our own economy" (if we can!).

3. *Expand private investment abroad.* To bring this about requires both more "pull" and more "push." More "pull" could come from a better investment climate abroad, which bilateral negotiations have notably failed to bring about. It would be entirely suitable and perhaps effective to attack this problem now through the United Nations to work out a code of fair behavior and fair treatment for international private capital, and to provide some mutually agreed guarantees of such behavior and treatment.

Eisenhower simply proposes to go on with more of the same old bilateral negotiations.

MORE "push" for private capital investment should be provided by some new and effective mechanism to associate private risk capital with government funds in direct equity investment abroad, perhaps some mechanism like the International Finance Corporation which was proposed by the International Development Advisory Board under Nelson Rockefeller's chairmanship.

As with his tariff-reduction proposals, Eisenhower's investment encouragement proposals are too timid to have much impact. It is worth noting that their most important effect, if enacted, will be a windfall to *present* US investments abroad, which will then pay less taxes even if no expansion in investment takes place!

4. *Expand public investment in the wide variety of development projects that are, in under-developed countries and some others, characteristic governmental responsibilities (highways, irrigation, power, railroads, telecommunications, etc.).* This should include much more of the Export-Import Bank's present types of development loans. It should probably include also at least serious consideration of new forms of investment (*e.g.*, in income bonds, or in bonds repayable in local currency, or in general loans rather than project loans).

What does Eisenhower propose? A *reduction* in the development financing activity of the Export-Import Bank!

5. *Give economic aid to committed nations otherwise unable to support adequate defense activities (e.g., Greece, Turkey, Spain, Yugoslavia, Formosa, The Associated States of Indo-China).*

Eisenhower advocates the continuation of this kind of "mutual defense support" but only as temporary, emergency aid, to "be terminated as soon as possible consistent with our national interest."

6. *Expand economic aid greatly, in support of the kind of economic growth and social development that alone can build real strength in the free world.* This economic aid should of course be integrated with technical assistance, as each form of assistance (dollars and know-how) is most effective when combined with the other.

Here is where Eisenhower's economic program diverges most widely from the program which would really be effectively anti-Communist. On one hand, he recommends "pressing forward vigorously" with international technical co-operation, a method of aiding and influencing growth and change abroad that has been quickly imitated by Soviet Russia. On the other hand, he proposes curtailment and early termination of the economic aid that makes technical assistance possible in the here and now. (For the fiscal year 1955 the President is *asking* Congress—what he will *get* is another matter—to appropriate only $388 million for non-military "development assistance" and "technical co-operation"—*11.2 percent of the total appropriation requested for the Mutual Security Program.*)

Eisenhower points out that "as we curtail our aid, we must help to close the dollar gap by expanding our foreign investment and trade," because "the solidarity of the free world and the capability of the free world to deal with those who would destroy it are threatened by continued unbalanced trade relationships. . . ." Yet he is quite willing, to curtail aid *before* there is any assurance either that the Congress will approve his limited program to expand trade and investment, or that this program will have any of the desired effects. Responsibility for closing the dollar gap and promoting economic growth abroad is thus prematurely shifted to the private trader and investor. The two major instruments of foreign economic policy which *can* be relied upon, namely, public loans and economic aid, are in effect thrown overboard.

In 1952, speaking before the *Herald-Tribune Forum*, General Eisenhower said: "In concert with our closest allies, a long-term consistent program should be produced, directing all of our economic power toward reviving free world economies and trade as a whole."

In his March 30 message to Congress this year, Eisenhower summarized his foreign economic program thus:

> *Aid—which we wish to curtail,*
> *Investment—which we wish to encourage,*
> *Convertibility—which we wish to facilitate, and*
> *Trade—which we wish to expand.*

On paper, these objectives are sound enough—but unfortunately far from enough; missing are adequate *practical* measures, energetically pressed by Republican leadership, which can result in expansion (to any marked degree) of foreign investment and world markets, or the economic strengthening of our allies, or the healthy growth of under-developed areas.

From Eisenhower's March 30 message, it is clear that by "investment" he means private investment. But what is there in his program that *will* stimulate private investors to make large, new, risk investments abroad? All

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he recommends is minor tax relief. He also "suggests that Congress consider" broadening existing investment guarantees.

Yet even if private capital does go abroad it will continue to go to Canada, some parts of Latin America, Africa and the Middle East; it will go primarily into oil and other extractive industries; it will avoid almost entirely many industries and many nations, including some of those where US security interests are most immediately threatened.

THE EISENHOWER aim of "convertibility" of currencies is of course desirable, when it comes it will strengthen the world economy. But it will be as much a result as a cause of world economic vitality. And what Eisenhower proposes as the US contribution to convertibility is not likely to accomplish much unless US imports and foreign investments expand substantially.

As for Eisenhower's desire to expand "trade," since 1934 the US has had a good deal of success in expanding imports, partly through much greater tariff reductions than are now proposed by the Republican Administration. Even if all the Eisenhower trade recommendations were enacted by a recalcitrant Congress, they are not likely to bring about enough increase in US imports to counter-balance the reduction in US demand for foreign products caused by diminished US stockpiling and lower levels of business activity at home.

In fact, Republican trust is being placed in what can best be described as "static security." This new form of an old disease, *Maginotitis,* appears as a naïve faith in pacts with military aid, and in the dangerous assumptions that people will do what their constituted leaders tell them to.

Should it not be apparent by now that military aid is useless, or even dangerous, to the security of the free world if the men who receive it do not have the will to use it for the defense of the free world? If it proved nothing else, our experience in China demonstrated that it matters a good deal to us which way the guns we furnish are pointed.

The Communist threat is a two-fold one, involving military aggression or civil revolution, on the one hand, and politico-economic agitation, maneuver and subversion on the other. Military strength to meet the one threat is as important as social, economic and political strength to meet the other. But military strength is dependent on social, economic and political strength. Behind weapons and trained forces, a country needs local supplies of food, uniforms and ammunition, as well as arsenals and transportation systems. Even more, it needs the will to fight for its future, and its future must therefore be worth fighting for, as the last eight tragic years in Indo-China so clearly demonstrate.

In the "static security" concept, treaties play a large part. One chooses up sides. One signs treaties with nations which are of like mind (or which now have leaders of like mind). Then, apparently, one sits it out.



Okay, amigo, now how about the ship to go under it?

What is wrong about this approach? First, while treaties involve obligations and are reliable contracts in some circumstances, it is not really the treaty that makes an ally of another nation. Nations sign treaties *after* both recognize mutual interests that can be served by their joint efforts.

Second, countries are effective as allies only if they themselves are strong. They bring no more strength to the group effort than they already have. Too early and too heavy a military burden may, particularly in underdeveloped areas, mean a *weakening* of the political, social and economic structure.

Third, and perhaps most important, this is basically a short-run approach despite the protestations of the Administration that it is planning for the long pull. The approach assumes political stability within the countries allied with us.

ISN'T IT clear, then, where the Administration stands in fact in the battle with Communism? It will arm itself and its friends. It will provide economic aid in emergencies and as temporary defense support. It will provide some technical assistance. Half measures are proposed to bring about expanded imports, stabilization of prices and demand for food and raw materials, and increased investment. For the rest, it throws up its hands.

(*This is the first in a series of two articles by Mr. Hayes on US foreign economic policy.*)

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▶ *In these pages last week, former Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace called the present policy of rigid, high price supports "unrealistic." Surpluses of food and fiber accumulated under that policy, he said, threaten to destroy the Ever-Normal Granary and other essential features of the farm program evolved during the 30's. He urged a system of flexible supports and the use of our surplus stocks to help hungry peoples abroad.*

Don't Kick the Farmer

by C. Clyde Mitchell

HENRY WALLACE has set forth a number of well-intentioned proposals He recognizes social problems on a national and international scale and he demonstrates honest humanitarianism. However, he fails to come to grips with, or demonstrate awareness of, the two major problems of the American economy in 1954: (1) whether America can successfully carry out a national policy of "full employment," and (2) whether America will lead the free world into a future of vastly increased productivity and higher levels of living.

If America intends to accomplish these two basic objectives, Mr. Wallace's arguments directed at reducing agricultural production and prices are meaningless; we need all we can produce, and at good prices. If America does not seriously intend to make a national full employment policy work and lead the free world into a more prosperous and a happier future, then the American economic system will have failed in a crucial moment of history. In that event, *any* agricultural program, high, low, flexible or two-price is going to break down under surpluses all across the board.

Farm-price reductions will *not* materially reduce agricultural production nor increase consumption. Farmers (who respond quite readily to a rising price and good times by increasing production) do not respond to a falling price by reducing production, because they can not. Their investments in land, equipment and skills have become "fixed" at the higher level. Only a few of the more "flexible" farmers can respond to flexible prices by shifting to something else, assuming "something else" exists. But when prices in agriculture generally are dropping, as they are now and as they will any time the American economy goes into a decline, there are no alternatives for even the flexible few to adopt.

Proponents of flexible prices claim that lowered prices will induce consumers to buy more, "broaden" the farmer's market, so that the lower prices "Won't be so bad after all." It is time this argument is nailed for the nonsense it is. American consumers do not customarily buy more food when retail prices drop—they spend such windfall savings on other goods and services. Furthermore, even when farm prices plummet, the inflexibilities in marketing margins allow only a small drop at the retail level and often no drop at all. Processors and middlemen cannot take any sizable reduction in cents per unit, because their costs are inflexible too.

A national policy which keeps farm income moving steadily upward along with national prosperity is better for the economy generally than fluctuations. Farmers are important consumers, particularly of machinery, chemicals, and durable consumer goods—industries which are now suffering. A national policy which requires a downward adjustment in farm production or prices will put on the farmer the entire burden of a major failure in the national and international systems of income-distribution.

LET US be more specific. Proposals to adjust agricultural production downward, either through production restrictions, or through the "incentive" of a depressed price, imply acceptance of the "war expansion fallacy." This is a view that American food and fiber-production are "over-expanded by war" and should be "adjusted" downward. Of course it is true that some war items, the production of which we expanded rapidly, have been rendered obsolete by peace. Production of food and fiber was expanded during wartime, but here the similarity ceases. Our food and cotton are needed, even more than they were in wartime, both here and elsewhere in our world.

Mr. Wallace notes the problems of hungry people and the related spread of Communism, but apparently is convinced that there is no real market for our surpluses in such areas aside from charity gifts. He overlooks the

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far more important role our surpluses can play if they are made part of a well-rounded program of education and technical development.

ARE *high fixed price supports the right answer?* Prices at present levels have undoubtedly helped some fortunately situated farm operators to get rich. A few highly publicized farm incomes, however, should not obscure a basic fact. Average farm incomes are still very low, less than half of average urban incomes, and it is a mistake to call present price-support levels "high."

However, no one should claim that the present program of fixed price supports is the right and final answer to the problems of American agriculture. If solutions are not found in two other problem areas, our present program of price supports, or *any other* program of price or income supports, including the flexible plan, will prove to be so costly and so wasteful that farmers and consumers alike will demand a change: (1) The first major problem that price policy will not solve is that of expanding consumption of agricultural products among Americans (and to some extent people in other lands) to use our agricultural production as it should be used, to eat, to wear, to improve levels of living. (2) The second is the problem of the one-third of our farm families who are working uneconomic farm units and living at a level far below our American ideas of decency.

The American farmers, and people who study their problems both in Congress and in the educational institutions, would be quite willing for changes to be made in the type and level of price supports if these two fundamental problems of consumption expansion and farm poverty were simultaneously made subjects of adequate legislation and governmental action programs. Such a "legislative package" would be almost an "enabling act" to carry out the broad and optimistic principles of the Employment Act of 1946:

1. This program would commit us to the virtual abolition of malnutrition in America. It would accept the principle that health education, including participation in an improved hot-lunch program, is an essential part of the educational process for all our children. It would make money and food available to get the program in operation in practically all schools. It would include adequately financed plans to distribute healthful foods to all our citizens who are not able, because of low incomes, to pay for a good diet. If "full employment" is maintained, diets in employed families will continue to improve in the direction of more milk, meats, fruits and vegetables. Instead of worrying about surpluses of those foods, we will have to produce 50 to 75 percent more of them within a short period of 10 years.

2. Our two most serious "surplus" crops, wheat and cotton, are needed throughout the world by people whose diet and living level are so poor that even our large surpluses are very small in comparison to the need. Our stocks can be very important levers, however, if they are used correctly, as part of a well-rounded program of economic development in the under-developed nations. Correct use demands that the American goods be funnelled mainly into educational channels, to support large-scale vocational training programs among the youth of the under-developed areas. This use of the food will reduce population pressure as the nations make the transition from rural to industrial life.

3. To guarantee that our nation could carry out the commitments contained in this broad attack on the under-consumption problem, as well as for reasons of strategy and weather insurance, we should adopt the principle of "security storage." All storable crops would become part of this Security Storage, maintained at a level which could stabilize our domestic consumption and enable us to keep our international commitments. The level would be different for different crops, but for most storables it should be roughly one full year's domestic production.

4. A major part of the legislative program must be aimed at better utilization of the under-employed human resources on the low-income American farms. Farmers Home Administration experience indicates that for low-income farmers to intensify their economic operations and achieve a decent living they must be able to obtain farm management assistance and adequate credit at low interest rates. This credit, if FHA history is a guide, will be repaid with virtually no loss. The amount of loan funds, however, will be large—somewhere between two and three million low-income farm families now would need on the average $5,000 in new credit to finance the reorganization of their farms for efficient production.

5. Concentration on the poverty problem does not mean that the middle-income family farm is to be neglected—adequate credit for improvements in farm organization should be made available. Improvements in farm-and-home planning, soil conservation and improved land-use continue to be necessary.

6. Then, after fairly definite assurance has been achieved (in the above-mentioned segments of this omnibus bill for agriculture) that the problems will be attacked which cannot adequately be solved by any price policy—then and only then can Americans who work to obtain fair treatment for agriculture willingly agree to a reduction in the level and scale of price supports.

THE NATURE of these proposals harks back to the innovations in agricultural policy of the thirties, in which Henry Wallace played a great part. But today, we must go much farther. To follow the course I have suggested would mean profound, dramatic action on the part of government—programs which would cost money, require expansion of some government activities, and perhaps bring about increased budgetary deficits for a time—in short, many of the things that campaign pledges promised to change. But unless these things are done, I fear that the current retreat in agricultural income foreshadows a serious failure of the American economy.

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GERALD W. JOHNSON: *The Superficial Aspect*

J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER did commit an offense against the United States, but its gravamen was not his association with Communists. That association was merely a logical outgrowth of the original error, which was Oppenheimer's assumption that there is something in the world so important that it justifies a citizen of a democracy in failing to qualify himself to perform his civic duty.

In his youth Oppenheimer assumed that science, specifically the science of physics, is more important than politics. It is true that when one surveys the obscenity now raging in Washington under the name of politics the error is understandable; an intelligent man might easily be persuaded that anything, that a game of tiddly-winks is more important than the witless buffooneries currently mistermed the conduct of public affairs.

Nevertheless, that opinion is heresy, for the current show is not the art of self-government. It is a vicious travesty of that art; and the art can be travestied because, for one reason, men like Oppenheimer have believed that the pursuit of some other good excuses them from qualifying as judges of the performance.

However, Oppenheimer reformed long ago. The depression and Hitler's extermination of the Jews opened his eyes and he renounced the heresy of non-participation. Unfortunately, renunciation of heresy did not instruct him in the true faith, and he stumbled for awhile, which gave "the swinish cult of anti-intellectualism" their chance to turn upon and rend him.

Oppenheimer is cured. He knows, now, that while science may be physics, politics is *physis,* nature itself, the subject of all sciences. One may not live well without knowledge, but before one lives well it is necessary first to live; and in a democracy the matter of survival cannot without appalling danger be left to the brainless.

Oppenheimer, realizing this, is no longer a problem, but what about the thousands of others who are guilty of the same offense and have never reformed? They are not all scientists; indeed, scientists constitute a minority of the heretics. Everyone has heard businessmen of high ability actually boast of their contempt for politics. If it were contempt for politicians of a very common type this might be salutary and praiseworthy; but politics is the conduct of public affairs, and a man who is contemptuous of politics is contemptuous of life, which is not rational.

Writers, artists, musicians, many types gifted with imagination and intellectual courage have embraced this heresy, and their conduct means a subtraction from the sum total of intelligence in the management of the country. If we were living under a benevolent dictator this might not matter; but we are living in a democracy in which the people are charged with final responsibility. To the extent to which intelligence is withdrawn from the electorate, government in a democracy is turned over to the stupid.

It is a discouraging fact that it is precisely on the higher levels of intelligence that one finds most prevalent the silly notion that participating in politics means running for the legislature, or some equally absurd activity. What it really means is following events closely enough to form an intelligent opinion on issues and candidates. This involves some tedium always, and frequently a great deal; but tedium in acquiring knowledge is no excuse for an intelligent man's refusing to learn.

Tocqueville, Dickens, Trollope, Martineau all assure us that this form of Treason of the Clerks is a relatively late development in America. When Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, disputing the meaning of *aristoi,* hurled massive quotations from the Greek at each other it was assumed as a matter of course that any man who could read Greek knew all the candidates for the legislature and could identify the relatively honest. But when George William Curtis and his friends organized the Mugwumps and met an inglorious end buried under an avalanche of money-bags and bloody shirts, the intellectuals made their last stand, and it was John Adams' great-grandson, Henry, who led the rout from the stricken field.

Roosevelt, stuffing Washington with professors, tried to stage a revival, and perhaps Adlai Stevenson's Eggheads are another effort. But the restoration will not be accomplished by sporadic movements under exceptionally brilliant leaders. It will come only when it shall again be regarded as scandalous for any man learned enough to translate *E pluribus unum* not to know or care who is Governor of his own state.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Declining World of T. E. Lawrence

by Howard M. Sachar

IN RECENT WEEKS a startling biographical controversy has been raised among publishing circles in New York and London. A British author, Richard Aldington, has pronounced publicly that the saga of T. E. Lawrence is a myth. Although Aldington's views are to be incorporated in a book, he cites as pre-publication evidence several physical inconsistencies, and numerous military and diplomatic discrepancies in Lawrence's own autobiography. Lawrence, Aldington insists, could not possibly have accomplished all that he claimed; the Lawrence legend was a deliberate fabrication of its principal. Rushing to the defense of Lawrence's reputation, a group of friends and admirers of the late Oxford classicist has contended that the weight of personal observation ought properly to be given precedence over documents and statistics. The final denouement of this palpably iconoclastic affair will not be known until Aldington's evidence is published and weighed against earlier testimony.

But if it is not yet possible to evaluate the personal exploits of T. E. Lawrence, the time clearly has arrived for an evaluation of the world T. E. Lawrence described. His luster, after all, derives not merely from the victories to which he ostensibly led the Arabs, but also from the nobility with which he invested the Arab world. He himself wrote in his introduction to the *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*:

> It is intended to rationalize the campaign, that everyone may see how natural the success was and how inevitable, how little dependent on direction or brain, how much less on the outside assistance of the few British. It was an Arab war waged and led by Arabs for an Arab aim in Arabia.

Whatever their ultimate disagreement, here Lawrence was in completest accord with the most distinguished historians of the Arab awakening, George Antonius and Albert Hourani, both of whom devoted the breadth of majestically written histories to the thesis of Arab self-liberation. Even here, however, accuracy must give us pause. Lawrence surely mirrored the pride of the Arab world in the guerrilla campaign that evicted the Turk from the desert during Allenby's thrust from Sinai to Syria. Yet it is unlikely today that military analysts would ascribe the influence to Arab railway skirmishes that Lawrence and Arab nationalists proclaimed at the Paris Peace Conference. Feisal, the Arab spokesman, informed Clemenceau at Paris that one hundred thousand Arabs had taken part in the uprising; the facts, however, move the figure closer to ten thousand—and of these only two thousand were consistently armed. They were prodded, not led, by British officers.

"I meant to make a new nation," Lawrence wrote in the same account, "to restore a lost influence, to give twenty millions of Semites the foundation on which to build an inspired dream-palace of their national thoughts. So high an aim called out the inherent nobility of their minds, and made them play a generous part in events." Yet it is the irony of Lawrence's descriptive power that, although he portrays Feisal as the glittering reincarnation of Saladin, the Arab forays recalled by his talented pen are a chaos of cross-purposes and looting-parties.

Before the uprising the British High Commissioner in Egypt had made definite commitments to the Arabs, promises of independence unhesitatingly endorsed by the British Foreign Office. Then at Paris the pledges of McMahon were forgotten, as secret treaties were produced by covetous Allied colonial officials. It is possible that the guilt which consumed Lawrence during those treacherous moments was responsible for his disproportionate idealization of the Arab cause in the *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. Lawrence implies that this is so in the same autobiography, writing:

> By our swindle they were glorified. We paid for them our self-respect, and they gained the deepest feeling of their lives. The more we condemned and despised ourselves, the more we could cynically take pride in them, our creatures.

Yes, perhaps it was frustration that impelled Lawrence to elongate his own image into that of the sublime Arab. And that image seized the Western World and ennobled the Arab in direct relationship to the popular magnification of Lawrence. Western liberals, disheartened by the rash of secret agreements that eviscerated Wilson's Fourteen Points, might well say, as Lawrence had written in a letter to J. W. Richards:

> You guessed rightly that the Arab appealed to my imagination. It is the old, old civilization which has refined itself clear of household gods, and half the trappings which ours hastens to assume.

The image — the Lawrence-created image — of the forsaken Bedouin persisted beyond Paris to San Remo, where the claims of Feisal and his brothers were blandly ignored. The old unworkable promise of an immense Arab empire was abandoned for a series of A mandates. The sons of the Sherif Hussein watched helplessly as French railways bisected Arab Syria, and the Indian Government glutted Iraq with insufferably patronising civil servants (although Lawrence associated the perfidy with France, and ascribed genuinely tutorial motives to his own country). The photographs of Lawrence in this period reveal a little man, draped in the traditional Arab *kafiyah*, standing perplexed and shamefaced amidst a cluster of hearty, grinning colonial officials. For the better part of a decade, the spell of Lawrence's personality and prose sustained the classic portrait of the keen-visaged son of the desert, fighting a grim and lonely battle against Western politicians.

It is not without significance that the rise of Fascism on the one hand, and Zionism on the other, should have produced a subtle metamorphosis in the sponsorship of the Arab legend. By 1935 Lawrence himself had passed from the scene, the victim of a fatal motorcycle accident. It was no longer possible, to continue to suffuse the Arab and his aspirations with grandeur and romance.

The sponsorship, as a result, came now from Britain itself. From the

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notorious radio station at Bari Italian propaganda broadcasts were beamed to the Arab world, systematically undermining the integrity of the British and French mandates. Britain, as a result, was compelled increasingly to plead the Arab case against the latest *agent provocateur*—Zionism. It was far easier to placate the Arabs at the expense of the Jews than to risk Arab defections: a state of affairs ripe for Axis exploitation. The relaxation of control in Egypt and Iraq was one method of pouring oil on the seething waters of Arab nationalism. Another method was the issuance of the White Paper of 1939, thereby closing off Jewish immigration into Palestine at the most urgent moment of Nazi persecution in Europe. In response to the shocked outcry of Western liberals the British were ironically placed in the position of pleading the very Arab case they had rejected with such hauteur at San Remo.

There emerged once more, as a result, the full-blown stereotype of the desert aristocrat: but this time the characterization was produced in the official publications of the British Colonial Office. The White Paper of 1939 was merely the formal reflection of the new historiography. During the second World War the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which had taken a balanced view of Arab political capacity during the mid-thirties, now espoused the cause of Arab Federation with greater alacrity—as did such "private" spokesman as A. J. Toynbee and M. N. Seton-Williams. The ghost of T. E. Lawrence was revived at a most questionable moment in Near Eastern Affairs; it was a moment during which the star of Haj Amin al Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, rose as ominously as the fortunes of Rommel's *Afrika Corps*.

When, nevertheless, the War managed to end satisfactorily for the Allies, new circumstances dictated that the Lawrence-image of the Arab be preserved. For one thing, the Nazi threat was replaced by the lowering menace of Soviet imperialism; for another, the emergence of the State of Israel was a raw nerve in oil-conscious Foreign Ministries. Nothing had changed; the ghost could not be laid. Alas, the chiseled profile of Feisal no longer existed to induce the sympathy of Western liberalism. Nor was Israel the *bête noir* that the Ottoman Empire had been.

The post-war era, as a result, has become the period for a re-evaluation of T. E. Lawrence's world. The year 1951, which witnessed the publication of David Garnett's warm testimonial, *The Essential T. E. Lawrence,* was the same year in which a skilled and hardened reporter, John Roy Carlson, was impelled to write a terrifying exposé of the Arab world—a volume entitled *From Cairo to Damascus.* It was the end and beginning of a legend. Included in the Garnett collection is Lawrence's deathless description of his discovery of Feisal:

> I felt at first glance that this was the man I had come to Arabia to seek—the leader who would bring the Arab Revolt to full glory. Feisal looked very tall and pillar-like, very slender, in his long white silk robes and his brown head cloth bound with a brilliant scarlet and gold cord. His eyelids were dropped and his black beard and colourless face were like a mask against the strange, still watchfulness of his body.

Carlson, in turn, describes Sheikh Mahmoud Abu el Azaayim, the principal backer of the influential Arab Fascist Green Shirts:

> He was a stunted man, somewhat over four feet tall, draped in a black cape reaching to his ankles. . . . His beady little eyes, embedded in a sickly, yellow-brown face, looked at me craftily. A scraggly mustache covered his upper lip, and a thin beard the nakedness of his receding chin. His lips were thick, his ears large. The little man showed his full glory when he opened his mouth, revealing a set of long, uneven, canine-shaped yellow teeth, and sending forth a variety of unpleasant orders. . . . In our country, thanks to Hollywood, the word "sheikh" suggests a virile, handsome son of the desert dashing about on a full-blooded Arab charger. Undoubtedly there are some Valentino-like sheikhs. Nearly all I saw were quite the opposite.

The difference was more than that of individuals. The stereotype has changed because the Near Eastern world has been found out. It is difficult to discover, in the accounts of such contemporary reporters as Carlson, even the vestige of that undulating grandeur, that austere dignity, that single-minded courage that glowed from the Arab image created by Lawrence. Carlson, Lengyel, Reynolds, and other recent observers are preoccupied with the filth of the Arab village, the scurviness of the Arab soldier, the bombast of the Arab officers, their raving addiction to Nazi slogans, the black medievalism of the effendi class. Their descriptions blot out the serene *Arabia Deserta* that elevated the classic rhythms of T. E. Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, and Ronald Storrs. The world they describe is dominated by a Holy Alliance called the Arab League; it is a landlord-ruled world of bilharziasis and trachoma, and it encompasses a *fellahin* population eighty-five percent of whom suffer from chronic malnutrition and venereal disease. The world is savagely exploited by Communist and Fundamentalist propagandists, maneuvered for dynastic purposes by the calculating Hashemites. There is genuine liberalism in the Arab rectangle, too, a deep-rooted hunger for freedom and independence nursed tenaciously and heroically by students and teachers. But the progression toward freedom is but one slender strand in a larger tapestry of corruption and reaction; it is not the brilliant magic carpet on which T. E. Lawrence rode into battle. It is likely that the luminous Arab World of the *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* existed only for Lawrence and others who wished that it were so. The legend of Thomas Edward Lawrence may survive the scrutiny of historians. But it is not likely that the stylized world he described will linger much longer to bewitch the Western imagination.

Groves of Academe

MR. JARRELL, disarmingly, calls his book a "comedy"; the publishers, with an eye to the audience, call it a novel, and the reader must pay his money and take his choice. All questions of genre or mode apart, one faces at last the old question; what did the author intend?

Pictures From An Institution, by Randall Jarrell (Knopf; $3.50).

What is his attitude and what should ours be? From the first hard, witty, malicious thrusts to the last elegiac diminuendo Mr. Jarrell takes us through the antic gallery of types at Benton College, and the trip makes us, if not the angels, weep and laugh at moments when we do not grind our teeth in irritation at Mr. Jarrell.

Roman à clef, we mutter after the

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first sentence, and having identified the President and others satisfactorily, we move on to the novel thus unlocked. And the riches of absurdity disclosed obviously tickle Mr. Jarrell to the feeling that he has been an attendant lord in a scene of high comedy and low farce. The chapter called "Art Night" is the showpiece of the book and a delight to read; how familiar it all seems and how shrewd the sensibility that shows it to us. The empty undergraduate painting, the sculpture—"It's ugly but is it Art?" And of course the dance-group, the presentation of *The Spook Sonata.* All in all, it's a wonderful evening, a guided tour of the progressive women's college. Mr. Jarrell doesn't miss a trick.

There, one begins to think, the trouble lies; he misses and leaves out—nothing, at least nothing that can make his people and their world of Benton grotesque, heartless, inhuman. If there is a central character, it is the "I" who narrates, Mr. Jarrell himself, who would, one is sure, be the first to admit the obvious. At opposite poles in the scale of humanity are Gottfried Rosenbaum, the Austrian-Jewish musician, and Gertrude Johnson, the acid, vicious novelist-in-residence at Benton. In between we find a galaxy of fools and knaves of various sorts: President Robbins, who "was so well adjusted to his environment that sometimes you could not tell which was the environment and which was President Robbins"; his wife, whom "people did not like" and who "did not like people; and neither was sorry"; or the Whittakers, particularly Flo, who "really *was* benevolent, and efficiently so: if I were a town, there is no one I should rather have by me in a disaster." Others fill up the gallery, all types and all drawn with wit, a vivid sense of the absurd, and an ear for the cliché.

What an ear for the cliché! After fifty pages of *Pictures,* this reviewer felt as though he could never speak or write again, so hopeless did the chance of avoiding the damning cliché, the banal reaction, the suppositious insight that turns bromide in solution. Mr. Jarrell has mercy on few of his characters, the Rosenbaums and Constance excepted; above all he has no mercy on the reader, for who can match his wit, his analysis of motive and character, above all his learning? To match the latter one would have to go to graduate school and Take Everything, to resort to one of Mr. Jarrell's pet ironic devices, the Derogatory Capitalization. He suffers from total recall; one hopes everything he knows is in this book; otherwise the reader must feel that in such speculation madness lies. From analysis of the fictitious music of a post-Berg school to breezy reference to matters of Thomistic theology, from Milton to Einstein, from Capability Brown to Grimm's fairy tales, in German—German dialect! One wants to cry out, "Stop you have made the point. I know nothing. Nothing at all. I'm sorry I ever thought I did."

Humanly, the book troubles the heart. Why all the apparatus brought to bear on these odious vermin? Why destroy President Robbins with the main battery of a battleship when the first witty knife-thrust has done the job to perfection? Why belabor poor Gertrude; we know all there is to know of her in the first fifty pages; after that her subacid comments cease to amuse and she either bores us or we begin to wonder why it seems so particular with Mr. Jarrell. Much of what he ascribes to the destructive female novelist comes home to plague him. Everything must be at someone's expense, and feeding hands exist to be bitten. Despite the farce, the wit and the absurdity, Mr. Jarrell has written no comedy but a very revealing study of the antipathy of the writer to a patron, any patron, and in this peculiarly modern case, the patron is the academy. One cannot avoid the feeling that Mr. Jarrell has stabbed Benton with ingratitude, for all he may try to make up for it in the final pages.

This alone would trouble us little; more important, Mr. Jarrell cannot create character. His people, fools and knaves and geniuses, the good guys and the bad guys, are as flat, black-and-white fictions as the folk in a play by Arthur Miller. For one thing, we never know what they look like though we know Gottfried is big and Constance beautiful. We get little sense of world, of where we are, of a density of life. Only the truly creative novelist can give us these things and Mr. Jarrell has sense and tact enough to call this no novel. Under the wit we feel a void aching away for substance to fill it, and neither the devastating portraiture nor the wide spread of allusion can fill it, for the picture is indeed *la vie morte.*

There is no plot. We pass through the academic year, concentrating on the high spots. Mr. Jarrell's method is to pick up sets of characters, talk about them, then move on to others; occasionally he brings several of them together, as at Gertrude's ghastly party. Juxtaposition, contrast, parallelling—all these devices are effectively used. As for the satiric method, for all the amusement it affords, its secret becomes obvious after a few pages: take a cliché, reverse the crucial term, and there you are. Mr. Jarrell is a poet and brings a sensitivity to language to bear on his ironic study. He overdoes it. The structure will not bear the load of play with words. Oscar Wilde got away with it in an epigram. Perhaps he did the same in *The Importance of Being Earnest.* G. B. Shaw had the last word, though; he called that play "heartless." The moral judgment dooms Mr. Jarrel's book equally.

LOUIS O. COXE

A Bishop on Trial

WHEN the Un-American Activities Committee was framed, Martin Dies, its first chairman, acknowledged that it "might jeopardize fundamental rights far more important than the objective" it sought. His fears were well founded, as he himself apparently has recognized, since he is the author of House Concurrent Resolution No. 131, intended

I Protest, by G. Bromley Oxnam (Harper; $2.50).

to regulate the "procedure of Committees of Congress investigating Communism." Other proposals, directed toward the same end, are under Congressional consideration, and while it has yet to be discovered whether any good will come of them, they do at least face the fact that the behavior of the investigating committees needs correction.

To suppose that this means that there has been a change of heart would be going too far at present. But it may mean that it is now politically expedient to place some restraint upon the committees, which have undoubtedly lost some of their public support.

If this continues and the benefit proves durable, a generous share of the credit should go to Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, whose day before the Un-American Activities Committee in July, last year, unmasked the patrioteers for what they are, making their venality unmistakable.

Whether by seeking this hearing be-

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fore the Committee the bishop was conceding more to the Committee's function and authority than he should have done is still, perhaps, debatable. To have one's patriotism certified by such a group is a humiliation. It must also be noted that the stated purpose of the hearing was frustrated: the Committee avoided going through the file of which the bishop had complained and which he wished to see corrected, and substituted a plot to confuse and discredit him by surprise questions and spurious interrogation.

In a sane world, the situation presented by the hearing would have seemed grotesque. Up on the "dais," the shifty little men whose craftiness for once would fail them: the pompous Clardy, with offensive manners and dull-witted condescension; the glabrous Jackson, mentally agile but morally torpid, who had slandered the bishop on the floor of the House; the fumbling Velde, pursuing the plotted end in view with dogged aim through mists of half-awareness. Such men as these, sitting in judgment upon a distinguished churchman of outstanding intellect and moral stature, who had held the highest offices in the gift of the Protestant churches!

What the pygmy-men would settle was whether this man of stature who sat below them had sufficient pygmy-virtue, as they understood it, to deserve relief from casual slander through the release of misinformation.

But we do not live in a sane world. The neurotic patterns of our public life had given to these men authority and credence, and their verdicts, though pygmy-minded, could cast large shadows. They were the Commissioners of Conformity, and, if they said so, the non-conformist was a Communist: or he might as well be. This is what one of them had said about the man who sat before them.

With most witnesses so situated, the Committee would have succeeded, but not with Bishop Oxnam. He sprang some surprises himself, the chief of which was his possession of records covering practically his entire life, which enabled him to demolish the Committee's "charges" with unexpected documentary evidence. This documentation, added to the bishop's long experience in public life, his intellectual caliber, his admirable self-control and his enduring courage, won the day for him, and his victory may have been a turning-point. The proceedings were prominently reported and great multitudes saw them on television. The exposure of the Committee had dramatic impact, and there is no sign yet that it is making a recovery.

Meanwhile, the bishop, in his book, gives us a "play-by-play" account of his long day before the Committee, supplemented by facts which he was not able or not allowed to develop under the circumstances of the hearing, and interpreting the realities of which the session itself gave only glimpses. It cannot be read without a renewed sense of shock and dismay that the level of public life in the United States has permitted these vicious practices of the Un-American Committee with so little protest. The title of the book gives emphasis to this. The bishop not merely explains, as for most of the time he was compelled to do at the hearing—and as he was frequently prevented from doing when it was apparent that the explanation would be in his favor. He protests. And in his protest, the reader will find hope and promise, for it is still possible for Americans to return to their heritage of justice, of which Bishop Oxnam is so effectual a champion and so enheartening an exemplar.

A. POWELL DAVIES

Ways of the Novel

MARK SCHORER and Philip Toynbee both begin with this idea—the Garden of Eden is dull and the Serpent enters invited. Schorer tells—through the mind of one man remembering—a straight, chronological story of four people: as children they are very close friends, as adults they destroy one another. Toynbee also tells his story through the mind of one man, Adam, but Adam speaks in four voices: those of his Innocence, his Fall and his Punishment, as well as his own, which finally dominates; it is a convoluted, dream-like story of a man who shatters his marriage and very nearly destroys his wife and himself.

The Wars of Love, by Mark Schorer (McGraw-Hill; $3.50). *The Garden to the Sea,* by Philip Toynbee (Doubleday; $3).

The "fall from innocence" and the effort of a "fallen" man to understand and to justify, is the general concern of both authors. But the similarities in their work go beyond general concern: in Schorer's book the innocent state is "a summer thing" among children in "Cherry Valley"; in Toynbee's it is a "Garden" thing between childlike adults on an island; and in both, the causes of the fall are deeply seeded into each garden. What, after all, is more natural to children and the childlike than curiosity and its handmate, dissatisfaction? And what more fatal to innocence?

Yet, while sharing these things, Schorer and Toynbee have different intentions. The last words spoken by Schorer's man are, "I could still wish for another chance, even as . . . I could not see any place where another chance might have begun, for it all seemed to be made up of endings alone, endings and endings and endings, and no beginning at all, never a place to start from."

While in *The Garden to the Sea,* Adam's desperate "Is there nothing in this uncovered past except a cage of endings—end after end after end, and never a cool time without finalities?" is a question asked about one-third of the way through the book. In the last two-thirds Toynbee attempts to answer it.

These men, so close in their concern, differ as craftsmen—a difference not of accomplishment, but of tools. Their techniques are poles apart. Schorer looks to James; Toynbee to Joyce. For Schorer the tools are the single point of view, tight sequence of events, subtle prose and symmetrical construction. Toynbee works closer to the frontiers: the same event seen through four differently-distorting points of view, disordered time, a prose full of the devices of poetry, and a controlling myth.

Each of these ways of writing a novel has its traps, and neither Schorer nor Toynbee has wholly succeeded in avoiding those in his chosen way. Although Toynbee's techniques and his use of the myth of Adam and Eve enable him to say a great deal about the endurance of men, and the persistence of their hope despite the darkness and the chaos each contains, they make it difficult for him to convince in terms of a *man.* And Schorer's way, with all its proven virtues, leads him into the now almost classic dilemma of trying to reveal the true personality and motivations of a man by placing him in events which we see only through *his* distorting mind. As a result there is a residue of ambiguity,

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despite the subtlety of the prose and the construction, concerning exactly those motives which must be perceived most clearly if the novel is to have a personal meaning for the reader.

These, of course, are the everyday problems of art. And if either Schorer's or Toynbee's book were essentially stamped by the excesses or limitations inherent in the way each has chosen, they would be very bad books indeed. Both are quite good.

But Schorer and Toynbee are tremendously concerned with technique. And occasionally the devices they are trying to master, master them, and what it put on the page is only an exercise, meaningless as experience for the reader. Because of this concern with craft, both men have been praised in terms more relevant to dressmaking than to art. And because of these occasional lapses both have been criticized as tricksters — Schorer as a puppet-master with whom "one is always aware of device as device," and Toynbee as an upstart who ignores "the novel's peculiar virtues as a form." (Is *Don Quixote* a novel? *Pamela? The Old Wives Tale? Ulysses?*)

Since the revolt which freed us of the formless "message art" of the twenties and thirties has in turn hardened into a new conformism which has plagued us with thousands of finely wrought nothings, protests against "formalism" are more than justified. But justified only when made against forms which hold no substance, and so are not finally forms at all. Neither Schorer nor Toynbee is guilty of any such nonsense. Each is of a "school," but there have always been "schools," and always within such schools have been one or two men cherishing the desire—often long unconscious—to destroy in *their own work* all that their critical sense had caused them to borrow, determined to bend and forge their inheritance to their vision.

Schorer and Toynbee are artists, not camp-followers, despite the camps that claim them—their mark already is upon their borrowings. And their work could remind us that despite all the wailing about a "declining" art, despite all the fashions, there are men quietly intent upon the business of *making*. They may never reach the summit, or they may. But they are adding to the sum total of perception available to any one man, proving that art is not dead, nor is experience so meaningless and life so sterile that artists who work at the whole job cannot find, and make us experience, at least the hint of an order which contains its opposite. TOM FITZSIMMONS

A thoughtful ex-Communist speaks his mind

In this straightforward, unhysterical, and persuasive book, Granville Hicks tells of the strange appeal that Communism once had for men of good will like himself. His provocative story casts light on the mistakes of a whole generation of young thinkers who accepted the ideology of Communism. He tells what the experience meant to him, how he got out of the movement, and what we should do now to fight Communism at home. In a statement that clarifies the past and illuminates the present, he charts a course that reasonable and self-respecting Americans can follow. $3.50

WHERE WE CAME OUT

by Granville Hicks

THE VIKING PRESS, 18 E. 48 St., N.Y. 17

Medical Detectives

AMERICANS, who have one of the highest standards of public health in the world, usually take this fact for granted. They ignore a dedicated army of doctors and technicians in the employ of the local, state and national governments,

Eleven Blue Men, by Berton Roueché (Little, Brown; $3.50).

who fight continuous and sometimes desperate battles against poisons, viruses and bacteria—rewarded only by the statistic that the American lifespan is more than twice as great as that of other parts of the world where public-health services are at their worst.

Berton Roueché has written a fascinating story of some of these battles. They happened to be waged in the region of New York City, but he could have done an equally dramatic story about almost any other large community, and especially if it is a seaport. Each of his chapters (all of which have appeared in *The New Yorker*) is told chronologically, like a detective story. An old man collapses on the street and "his nose, lips, ears and fingers were sky-blue." A Puerto Rican sitting and smoking in his home notices an acrid odor of burning flesh. "It was his hand." Five old people admitted to a hospital within a few days of each other die of tetanus. Three other people living close together are admitted to a hospital with typhoid fever.

In each of these cases, the public-health detectives had no more to go on, at the beginning, than the facts stated. With enormous patience and what seems to a layman an astonishingly wide range of scientific apparatus, they tracked down the trouble in the dozen cases described by Mr. Roueché. The old man who collapsed in the street (and ten others who speedily did the same thing) had been poisoned in a cheap cafeteria when the wrong substance was put into a salt cellar. The Puerto Rican's leprosy doomed him to continuous and close supervision for years until he died (of something else). The victims of tetanus, who at first seemed to have no connection with each other, all proved to be customers of the same dope peddler. The origin of the typhoid infection was traced, with great skill, patience and some luck, to a breakdown in the sewage system in an apartment house, which had a fruit stand at the street level; in the house lived a typhoid carrier.

Mr. Roueché writes in the demure, almost monotonous prose style that is common to many contributors to *The New Yorker*. His very colorlessness is reassuring to hypochrondriacal readers, who cannot hear of any disease without developing its symptoms. Without any seeming attempt to do so, he fills you with admiration for the men who are so alert to the danger it is their business to checkmate, who over and over take personal risks beyond the call of duty.

BRUCE BLIVEN

Notes on the Critics

HOWARD M. SACHAR, a specialist on the Near East, is on the History faculty of the University of Massachusetts. LOUIS O. COXE, who teaches at the University of Minnesota, collaborated with Robert Chapman to write the stage version of *Billy Budd*. A. POWELL DAVIES is the Pastor of All Souls Church in Washington, D. C.

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CORRESPONDENCE

► D. H. Lawrence in Texas

Six months ago I read to my English classes excerpts from D. H. Lawrence's essay on Benjamin Franklin as an example of prose which attempts to persuade by charged language and wit. So it was that I was struck, at first, with terror when I read Mr. Charles Gallenkamp's account (*NR*, April 19) of the sort of things going on in the public schools in Houston, Texas (a teacher's suspension on the grounds that he read Lawrence's essay to his classes, the removal of art books containing pictures of nudes, etc.). However, as I remain, after six months, unsuspended and uninvestigated, the terror at length dwindled, leaving pity. . . . However, it is the refusal to let an *affaire* Lawrence in Houston upset one in Syracuse (or in Boston or in Walla Walla) that we must guard fiercely against; otherwise a universal darkness is quite possible. Houston is upsetting.

ROBERT L. CHAMBERLAIN

Syracuse, N. Y.

► The Dog in the House

Your editorial about Speaker Henry Clay and John Randolph's dog intrigued me greatly. On reading it, I had a vision of Senator McCarthy being expelled from the Senate carrying pistols and barking loudly as he was put out. But won't you tell me where I can read more about this episode? I have run through the columns of the Annals of Congress for the period referred to, and find no reference to it. One of my friends says he doubts that it ever happened.

CHARLES BROWN

New York City

(*As this editorial was contributed to the New Republic by Historian Irving Brant, we have asked him to supply the information.*—The Editors.)

I do not know whether anything had ever been published previously about the dog in the House. As a sample of the private complaints and reports made about it at the time, here is a letter written on December 2, 1811, by Representative John A. Harper of New Hampshire to former Senator William Plumer of that state, to be found in volume six of the Plumer Papers, Library of Congress:

> Our Speaker is a fine man, gives universal satisfaction, and not even Randolph himself has as yet attempted to embarrass him. He is a gentleman who commands respect and esteem, and keeps good order in the House. Mr. Randolph has brought his dog into the House only once this session, and then the Speaker ordered the doorkeeper to take *her* out (for she is a female). You may recollect that at the last session his dog created much disturbance and even quarreling.

IRVING BRANT

Washington, D. C.

► How the Parties Differ

Concerning your recent articles on our two-party system:

Many times in the past there *has* been scant difference in the Northwest between the Republican and Democratic Parties. Indeed, in the early part of this century — under Teddy Roosevelt and Pinchot — the Republicans were the party of conservation.

But today, the issue is sharp and clear cut, in reverse. The Republicans are upholding the Secretary's decision to abandon Hell's Canyon to the absentee Idaho Power Company. The Democrats oppose that decision. All the Republicans in Congress from the state of Oregon joined in supporting a bill to permit the biggest timber companies to take over land in the National Forests. Dr. Ira N. Gabrielson, president of the Wildlife Management Institute, called the bill "one of the crudest attempted land grabs in recent years." Democrats played a leading part in defeating the bill. The Republicans, under Secretary McKay, are pushing proposals to open National Monuments and National Parks to commercial exploitation. Democrats are, in general, opposing this policy.

So far as the great and burning question of conservation is concerned, the Democratic Party now is trying to safeguard our resources. The Republican Party is out to give them away.

RICHARD L. NEUBERGER

Salem, Oregon

► A Double Standard

To your excellent and somewhat frightening article, "The Case of Robert Oppenheimer," I would like to make a small but perhaps important addition. In speaking of the "hundreds, perhaps thousands of Americans' who have been severed from government service on far less substantial evidence than that which confronts Dr. Oppenheimer, you say, "it is also true that the Russians make no such distinctions in the case of German nuclear physicists as we seek to make now in choosing Americans."

Not only the Russians make no such distinction. One of our more valuable post-war acquisitions is Dr. Werner von Braun, the world's foremost rocket expert. Not so many years ago Dr. von Braun not only had several undesirable companions in the persons of Hitler and the gentlemen of the Third Reich, but had developed the buzzbombs which destroyed a large amount of British real estate, the V-2 rocket which did more of the same, only faster, and had under construction when the war ended, a multi-stage rocket with which he hoped to pulverize New York.

But we don't hear of anyone asking about Dr. von Braun's old friends—and rightly so. Instead we have the picture of Dr. Oppenheimer's head on the block—one of his country's truly great men who prevented Dr. von Braun's rocket from landing on New York with an atomic warhead.

ROBERT BUCHBINDER

Chicago, Illinois

► Author's Correction

In the footnote to my article in the April 19th issue of the *New Republic*, "Wire-Tap: The House Approves," you state that I have published articles on wire tapping in the "*Harvard, Yale,* and *Columbia Law Reviews.*" While I have published articles or book reviews in each of those journals, my articles on wire tapping have appeared only in *The Columbia Law Review, The Nation,* and *The New Leader.*

ALAN F. WESTIN

Cambridge, Mass.

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—PROFESSOR D. F. FLEMING, *The Nation*

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